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Abstract
We propose an aggregation model which explains stereotype for-
mation under the attribution hypothesis. We show, under very mild
axioms, that an observer can be thought of perceiving a group in terms
her subjective opinion about the representativeness of subgroups as
well as a possible prejudice she might have.
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11 Posing the Problem
A stereotype is an overall judgment brought over a given group of objects,
such as ￿Princeton students are smart￿ , ￿French food is delicious￿or ￿Muslim
women wear scarf￿ . Understanding the formation of stereotypes is a central
question of social psychology. As Krueger et al. (2003) eloquently discuss,
a main strand of the literature rests on the attribution hypothesis which
assumes a direct association between traits and groups. Under the attribution
hypothesis, an observer judges a group according to the traits he observes in
that group. For example, he looks at Muslim women; sees that some wear a
scarf and some do not; his mental processing of that observation leads to some
kind of a general judgment about Muslim women such as ￿Muslim women
wear scarf￿or as ￿Muslim women do not wear scarf￿ . Of course, bringing
no judgment hence avoiding a stereotype is also possible. According to the
attribution hypothesis, a trait which is ￿su¢ ciently prevalent￿ in a given
group is associated with that group. To quote Zawadski (1948), ￿The popular
conception of a group characteristic seems to be a characteristic which is
present in the majority of the members of the group. According to this
concept, it is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for a group characteristic
to be represented in at least 51 per cent of the members of the group￿ .
We ￿nd this understandable, even when informally stated. However, the
concepts which embrace the attribution hypothesis can be made further in-
telligible through a formal model. It goes without saying, for an economic
theorist, that once a relationship between the subjective perception of a group
and the individual traits prevailing among the members of that group is pos-
tulated, tools of social choice theory have something to contribute to our
understanding of the problem. In fact, the main concepts of stereotype for-
mation under the attribution hypothesis can be formally expressed through
an aggregation model ￿ la Arrow (1951).
We propose the following model: Take some group, e.g., Turkish citizens,
and a certain trait, e.g., smoking. Some of the members of the group do and
some do not possess this trait and a judgement such as ￿Turks do smoke￿is
an aggregation of individual traits into a social one. So we can speak of a
perception function that maps individual traits into a subjective stereotype
about the society. More formally, we have a ￿nite set N of individuals with
#N ￿ 2, to which we refer as a group. There is a trait which the members
of the group may or may not possess. We write ti = 1 when i 2 N possesses
this trait and ti = ￿1 otherwise. We let T = f￿1;1gN stand for the set of
trait pro￿les. There is an observer1 who looks at the group which exhibits
1To avoid confusion, we assume that the observer is not a member of the group. Al-
2a trait pro￿le t = (t1;:::;t#N) 2 T. Not necessarily all members of the
group are visible to the observer. We write V ￿ N for the members of
the group that are visible to the observer. An observer who sees V ￿ N
is aware of the existence of the unobserved NnV . On the other hand, we
rule out the possibility of ￿wrong observation￿ , i.e., the trait of every visible
member of the group is observed as it truly is. We let TV = f￿1;1gV stand
for the set of trait pro￿les of the observable members. The observer has a
subjective perception of the group as a function of the trait pro￿le he is able
to observe, which we express through a (subjective) perception function  V :
TV ! f1;0;￿1g. So given any non-empty set V ￿ N of observed members
and any prevailing trait pro￿le t 2 TV of these observed members, we write
 V(t) = 1 when the observer globally perceives the group N as possessing the
trait in question. Similarly, we write  V(t) = ￿1 when the observer globally
perceives the group as not possessing the trait in question and  V(t) = 0
refers to the observer￿ s abstension of reaching a global perception of the
group. We refer to the case V = N as perfect observation and to V ￿ N as
imperfect observation. Under perfect observation, we write   instead of  N.
What kind of perception functions are used? We approach the problem
axiomatically by considering the cases of perfect and imperfect observation
separately.
2 Stereotype Formation Under Perfect Ob-
servation
2.1 Towards a Solution: Axioms for Perception
Being sensitive to individual traits is incorporated in the concept of a per-
ception function. So, we wish to rule out imposed perceptions that are inde-
pendent of individual traits such as ￿Muslims do not drink alchool because
this is what the Quran says￿ . Hence we posit that under perfect observation,
the observer would say ￿Muslims do not drink alchool￿if no Muslim drinks
alchool and ￿Muslims do drink alchool￿if every Muslim drinks alchool. We
express these through the following axiom:
Non-Imposedness: A perception function   : T ! f1;0;￿1g is non-
imposed i⁄  (1;1;:::;1) = 1 and  (￿1;￿1;:::;￿1) = ￿1.
Non-imposedness is a weak unanimity requirement which rules out im-
posed perceptions while it does not exclude biased ones such as saying ￿Mus-
though this has no e⁄ect to our model, belongingness of the observer to the observed group
seems to actually matter, according to our intepretation of Krueger et al. (2003).
3lims eat porc￿if and only if every Muslim eats porc and saying ￿Muslims
do not eat porc￿even when there exists a single Muslim who does not eat
porc. It is clear that such a perception is based on an unequal treatment of
traits. Of course this may happen but when we wish to rule it out, we use
the following axiom:
Impartiality: A perception function   : T ! f1;0;￿1g satis￿es impar-
tiality i⁄  (￿t) = ￿ (t) 8t 2 T.
Remark that given a trait pro￿le t, the trait pro￿le ￿t stands for the
reversal of every individual trait. So impartiality is an adaptation of the
usual neutrality condition of social choice theory which ensures the equal
treatment of alternatives. An observer with an impartial perception function
is not prejudiced about the group￿ s possessing or not possesing the trait: If
the trait of every observed individual is reversed then so is the perception.
In contrast to what impartiality requires, one can perceive a society under
an unequal treatment of the traits. For example, it is possible that the
observer has a bias towards thinking that the society exhibits the trait in
question. Such a bias is formally expressed through the following axiom:
Positive Prejudice: We say that a perception function   : T !
f1;0;￿1g admits positive prejudice i⁄
(i) 9 t 2 T such that   (t) = 1 and   (￿t) 2 f0;1g
and
(ii)   (t) 2 f0;￿1g =)   (￿t) = 1 8t 2 T.
So under a perception function admitting positive prejudice, there is a
trait pro￿le t such that the trait is rejected neither at t nor at ￿t. Moreover,
there exists no trait pro￿le t such that the observer rejects the trait or is
undecisive both at t and ￿t .
Similarly, as expressed below, the observer can have a bias towards think-
ing that the society does exhibit the trait in question:
Negative Prejudice: We say that a perception function   : T !
f1;0;￿1g admits negative prejudice i⁄
(i) 9 t 2 T such that   (t) = ￿1 and   (￿t) 2 f￿1;0g
and
(ii)   (t) 2 f0;1g =)   (￿t) = ￿1 8t 2 T
Another axiom we borrow from the social choice literature is a monotonic-
ity condition: If a trait pro￿le changes so that some individuals who did not
possess the trait now possess it while this is the only change, then the percep-
tion should not a⁄ected in the opposite direction. We express this formally
as follows:
Monotonicity: A perception function   : T ! f1;0;￿1g is monotonic
i⁄  (t) ￿  (t0) 8t;t0 2 T with ti ￿ t0
i 8i 2 N.
4These axioms pave the way to the characterization of a class of percep-
tion functions which we call subjective majority rules. We have three main
characterization results where we use the conjunction of non-imposedness
and monotonicity with one of impartiality, positive prejudice and negative
prejudice.2 We close the section by establishing the logical independence of
the axiom triples that we use.
Proposition 2.1 Non-imposedness, monotonicity and impartiality are logi-
cally independent.
Proof. To see that impartiality and non-imposedness do not imply monotonic-
ity, let #N = 3 and consider   : T ! f1;0;￿1g which is de￿ned for each
t 2 T as   (t) = 1 when #fi 2 N : ti = 1g 2 f1;3g and   (t) = ￿1 otherwise.
To see that impartiality and monotonicity do not imply non-imposedness,
take   (t) = 0 for all t 2 T. Finally, to see that non-imposedness and
monotonicity do not imply impartiality, let   (t) = ￿1 if ti = ￿1 8i 2 N and
  (t) = 1 otherwise.
Proposition 2.2 Non-imposedness, monotonicity and positive prejudice are
logically independent.
Proof. To see that positive prejudice and non-imposedness do not imply
monotonicity, let #N = 3 and consider   : T ! f1;0;￿1g which is de-
￿ned as  (￿1;￿1;￿1) = ￿1,  (1;1;￿1) = 0 and   (t) = 1 otherwise. To
see that positive prejudice and monotonicity do not imply non-imposedness,
take   (t) = 1 for all t 2 T. Finally, to see that non-imposedness and
monotonicity do not imply positive prejudice, let   (t) = 1 if ti = 1 8i 2 N
and   (t) = ￿1 otherwise.
Proposition 2.3 Non-imposedness, monotonicity and negative prejudice are
logically independent.
Proof. To see that negative prejudice and non-imposedness do not imply
monotonicity, let #N = 3 and consider   : T ! f1;0;￿1g which is de-
￿ned as  (1;1;1) = 1,  (￿1;￿1;1) = 0 and   (t) = ￿1 otherwise. To
see that negative prejudice and monotonicity do not imply non-imposedness,
take   (t) = ￿1 for all t 2 T. Finally, to see that non-imposedness and
monotonicity do not imply negative prejudice, let   (t) = ￿1 if ti = ￿1
8i 2 N and   (t) = 1 otherwise.
2Remark that impartiality, positive prejudice and negative prejudice are pairwise logi-
cally incompatible.
52.2 A Solution: Subjective Majority Rules
We ￿rst de￿ne a (subjective) weight distribution as a mapping ! : 2N ! [0;1]
such that !(K)+!(NnK) = 1 for all K 2 2N while !(N) = 1. So ! expresses
the subjective opinion of the observer about the representation weight of each
subgroup of N. A weight distribution ! is monotonic i⁄!(K) ￿ !(L) for all
K;L 2 2N with K ￿ L. For the rest of the paper, we embed monotonicity
into the de￿nition of a weight distribution.
Given a weight distribution ! and any q 2 (0;1), a subjective (!;q)￿majority
rule is a perception function  
!;q : T ! f1;0;￿1g de￿ned for each t 2 T as
follows:
 
!;q(t) =
8
<
:
1 if !(fi 2 N : ti = 1g) > q
￿1 if !(fi 2 N : ti = ￿1g) > 1 ￿ q
0 otherwise
9
=
;
So the observer looks at the group with some subjective opinion about
how representative the subgroups are. If, according to this subjective opin-
ion, the weight of those who possess the trait exceeds q, then the observer
concludes that the group globally possesses that trait. Similarly, if the (sub-
jective) weight of those who possess the trait is below q, then the observer
concludes that the group globally does not possess that trait.3 If neither of
these two cases holds then no conclusion is derived.
Theorem 2.1 A perception function   : T ! f1;0;￿1g satis￿es non-imposedness,
monotonicity and impartiality i⁄   is a subjective (!; 1
2)￿majority rule.
Proof. We leave the ￿if￿part to the reader. To see the ￿only if￿part, take
any perception function   : T ! f1;0;￿1g that satis￿es non-imposedness,
monotonicity and impartiality. We de￿ne W  = fK 2 2N :   (t) = 1 for
t 2 T with ti = 1 8i 2 K and ti = ￿1 8i 2 NnKg and L  = fK 2 2N :
  (t) = ￿1 for t 2 T with ti = 1 8i 2 K and ti = ￿1 8i 2 NnKg. As
  is non-imposed, N 2 W  and ; 2 L , hence W  and L  are each non-
empty. Let O  = 2Nn(W  [ L ) be the (possibly empty) set of coalitions
which are neither in W  nor in L . Now consider a function ! : 2N ! [0;1]
de￿ned for each K 2 2N as ! (K) = 1 if K 2 W , ! (K) = 0 if K 2 L 
and ! (K) = 1
2 if K 2 O . As   is impartial, for each K 2 2N, we have
K 2 L  () NnK 2 W  which implies K 2 O  () NnK 2 O . Thus
! (K)+! (NnK) = 1 8K 2 2N while ! (N) = 1. Moreover, the monotonicity
3Remark that !(fi 2 N : ti = ￿1g) > 1 ￿q and !(fi 2 N : ti = 1g) < q are equivalent
requirements. However, we use the former statement to be coherent with our de￿nition in
Section 3, where we consider subjective majority rules under imperfect observation.
6of   implies !(K) ￿ !(L) for all K;L 2 2N with K ￿ L. So ! is a
weight distribution. We complete the proof by showing that the subjective
(!; 1
2)￿majority rule  
!;1
2 : T ! f1;0;￿1g coincides with  . To see this,
take any t 2 T. If  (t) = 1, then K = fi 2 N : ti = 1g 2 W , implying
! (K) = 1 > 1
2, which establishes  
!; 1
2(t) = 1. If  (t) = ￿1, then K = fi 2
N : ti = 1g 2 L , implying ! (K) = 0, hence ! (NnK) = 1 > 1
2, which
establishes  
!;1
2(t) = ￿1. If  (t) = 0 then K 2 O , implying ! (K) = 1
2,
which establishes  
!;1
2(t) = 0.
Theorem 2.2 A perception function   : T ! f1;0;￿1g satis￿es non-imposedness,
monotonicity and positive prejudice i⁄   is a subjective (!;q)￿majority rule
with q 2 (0; 1
2) and !(K) 2 [q;1 ￿ q] for some K 2 2N.
Proof. To see the ￿if￿part, take any subjective (!;q)￿majority rule  
!;q
with q 2 (0; 1
2) and !(K) 2 [q;1 ￿ q] for some K 2 2N. It is straightforward
to check that  
!;q satis￿es non-imposedness and monotonicity. To show that
 
!;q satis￿es positive prejudice, take some K 2 2N with !(K) 2 (q;1 ￿ q].
Remark that  
!;q (t) = 1 and  
!;q (￿t) 2 f0;1g for t 2 T with ti = 1 8i 2 K
and ti = ￿1 8i 2 NnK. Now take any t 2 T with  
!;q (t) 2 f0;￿1g. Thus,
letting K = fi 2 N : ti = 1g, we have !(K) ￿ q, hence !(NnK) > q,
implying  
!;q (￿t) = 1, showing that  
!;q satis￿es positive prejudice. To
see the ￿only if￿part, take any perception function   : T ! f1;0;￿1g that
satis￿es non-imposedness, monotonicity and positive prejudice. Let W , L 
and O  be de￿ned as in the proof of Theorem 2.1. Note that N 2 W  and
; 2 L  while O  may be empty. Now pick some q 2 (0; 1
2) and consider a
function ! : 2N ! [0;1] de￿ned for each K 2 2N as ! (K) = 0 if K 2 L ,
! (K) = q if K 2 O . Moreover, if K 2 W , then let ! (K) = 1 when
NnK 2 L ; ! (K) = 1￿q when NnK 2 O  and ! (K) = 1
2 when NnK 2 W .
As   satis￿es positive prejudice, for each K 2 L  [O  we have NnK 2 W .
Thus ! (K) + ! (NnK) = 1 8K 2 2N while ! (N) = 1. Moreover, the
monotonicity of   implies !(K) ￿ !(L) for all K;L 2 2N with K ￿ L. So !
is a weight distribution. Note also that by positive prejudice, 9K 2 W  such
that NnK 2 W  [ O , implying !(K) 2 [q;1 ￿ q]. We complete the proof
by showing that the subjective (!;q)￿majority rule  
!;q : T ! f1;0;￿1g
coincides with  . To see this, take any t 2 T. If  (t) = 1, then K = fi 2 N :
ti = 1g 2 W  and ! (K) 2 f1
2;1￿q;1g implying ! (K) > q, which establishes
 
!;q(t) = 1. If  (t) = 0, then K = fi 2 N : ti = 1g 2 O  and ! (K) = q,
which establishes  
!;q(t) = 0. If  (t) = ￿1, then K = fi 2 N : ti = 1g 2 L 
and ! (K) = 0, hence ! (NnK) = 1 > 1￿q, which establishes  
!;q(t) = ￿1.
7Theorem 2.3 A perception function   : T ! f1;0;￿1g satis￿es non-imposedness,
monotonicity and negative prejudice i⁄   is a subjective (!;q)￿majority rule
with q 2 (1
2;1) and ! (K) 2 [1 ￿ q;q] for some K 2 2N.
Proof. To see the ￿ if￿part, take any subjective (!;q)￿majority rule  
!;q
with q 2 (1
2;1) and ! (K) 2 [1 ￿ q;q] for some K 2 2N. It is straightforward
to check that  
!;q satis￿es non-imposedness and monotonicity. To show that
 
!;q satis￿es negative prejudice, take some K 2 2N with ! (K) 2 (1 ￿ q;q].
Remark that  
!;q (t) = ￿1 and  
!;q (￿t) 2 f￿1;0g for t 2 T with ti = ￿1
8i 2 K and ti = 1 8i 2 NnK. Now take any t 2 T with  
!;q (t) 2 f0;1g.
Thus, letting K = fi 2 N : ti = 1g, we have ! (K) ￿ q > 1 ￿ q, implying
 
!;q (￿t) = ￿1 showing that  
!;q satis￿es negative prejudice. To see the
￿only if￿part, take any perception function   : T ! f1;0;￿1g that satis￿es
non-imposedness, monotonicity and negative prejudice. Let W , L  and O 
be de￿ned as in the proof of Theorem 2.1. Note that N 2 W  and ; 2 L 
while O  may be empty. Now pick some q 2 (1
2;1) and consider a function
! : 2N ! [0;1] de￿ned for each K 2 2N as ! (K) = 1 if K 2 W , ! (K) = q
if K 2 O . Moreover, if K 2 L , then let ! (K) = 0 when NnK 2 W ;
! (K) = 1 ￿ q when NnK 2 O  and ! (K) = 1
2 when NnK 2 L . As  
satis￿es negative prejudice, for each K 2 W  [ O  we have NnK 2 L .
Thus ! (K) + ! (NnK) = 1 8K 2 2N while ! (N) = 1. Moreover, the
monotonicity of   implies !(K) ￿ !(L) for all K;L 2 2N with K ￿ L. So
! is a weight distribution. Note that by negative prejudice, 9K 2 L  such
that NnK 2 O  [ L , implying ! (K) 2 [1 ￿ q;q]. We complete the proof
by showing that the subjective (!;q)￿majority rule  
!;q : T ! f1;0;￿1g
coincides with  . To see this, take any t 2 T. If  (t) = ￿1, then K =
fi 2 N : ti = 1g 2 L  and ! (K) 2 f0;1 ￿ q; 1
2g implying ! (K) < q,
hence ! (NnK) > 1 ￿ q, which establishes  
!;q(t) = ￿1. If  (t) = 0, then
K = fi 2 N : ti = 1g 2 O  and ! (K) = q, which establishes  
!;q(t) = 0.
If  (t) = 1, then K = fi 2 N : ti = 1g 2 W  and ! (K) = 1 > q, which
establishes  
!;q(t) = ￿1.
Remark 2.1 Monotonicity is a normatively appealing condition for percep-
tion functions and this is why we are keeping it throughout our analysis.
However, it is clear from their proofs that Theorems 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 can be
stated by simultaneously dispensing with the monotonicity of the perception
function and the monotonicity condition incorporated into the de￿nition of a
weight distribution.
Until now, we did not bring any requirement for an equal treatment of
individuals by the weight distribution !. In fact, at one extreme, it is possible
8to have an observer who believes that a group is fully represented in the
personality of one of its members d 2 N which would correspond to a weight
distribution !(K) = 1 for all K 2 2N with d 2 K. At the other extreme,
we have !=(K) =
#K
#N for all K 2 2N where all individuals are thought
of having equal weight. Given the subjective nature of weight distributions
(hence of stereotype formation), we do not think that an equal treatment of
individuals should be required. However, we wish to explore the e⁄ects of
imposing such a requirement. A perception function   : T ! f1;0;￿1g is
anonymous i⁄given any t = (t1;:::;t#N) 2 T and any bijection ￿ : N  ! N,
we have  (t1;:::;t#N) =  (t￿(1);:::;t￿(#N)). Given some ￿ 2 (0;1), a weight
distribution ! : 2N ! [0;1] is ￿￿anonymous i⁄ given any K;L 2 2N with
#K = #L we have ! (K) > ￿ () ! (L) > ￿ and ! (K) < ￿ ()
! (L) < ￿.4
Theorem 2.4 A perception function   : T ! f1;0;￿1g satis￿es non-imposedness,
monotonicity, impartiality and anonymity i⁄   is a subjective (!; 1
2)￿majority
rule for some 1
2￿anonymous !.
Proof. To show the ￿if￿ part, let   : T ! f1;0;￿1g be a subjective
(!; 1
2)￿majority rule where ! is 1
2￿anonymous. We know by Theorem 2.1
that   satis￿es non-imposedness, monotonicity and impartiality. To see the
anonymity of  , take any t = (t1;:::;t#N) 2 T. Let K = fi 2 N : ti =
1g. Take any bijection ￿ : N  ! N. Let ￿(t) = (t￿(1);:::;t￿(#N)) and
￿(K) = f￿ (i)gi2K. As ￿ is a bijection, #K = #￿(K). Moreover, fi 2
N : t￿(i) = 1g = ￿(K). Thus  (t1;:::;t#N) =  (t￿(1);:::;t￿(#N)) holds by the
1
2￿anonymity of !.
To show the ￿only if￿ part, take any   : T ! f1;0;￿1g satisfying
non-imposedness, monotonicity, impartiality and anonymity. We know, by
Theorem 2.1 that   is a subjective (!; 1
2)￿majority rule. To see that !
is 1
2￿anonymous, take any K;L 2 2Nnf;g with #K = #L. Take t =
(t1;:::;t#N) 2 T with fi 2 N : ti = 1g = K. Take also some bijec-
tion ￿ : N  ! N such that f￿ (i)gi2K = L. Now let ! (K) > 1
2. So
 (t) = 1. As   is anonymous,  (t￿(1);:::;t￿(#N)) = 1 as well, implying
!(fi 2 N : t￿(i) = 1g) = !(L) > 1
2. One can similarly establish that letting
! (K) < 1
2 implies ! (L) < 1
2, thus showing the 1
2￿anonymity of !.
Remark 2.2 The mathematics of our model belongs to the literature on ma-
jority characterizations, which goes back to May (1952). This allows to make
4Hence we also have ! (K) = ￿ () ! (L) = ￿. Note that ￿-anonymity is weaker than
a more standard anonymity condition which would require !(K) = !(L) for all K;L 2 2N
with #K = #L.
9a remark about Theorem 2.4. Consider a set A = fx;yg of alternatives and
let each i 2 N have a preference pi 2 f
x
y;
y
xg over A.5 Denoting xy for
indi⁄erence between x and y, we conceive a social choice rule as a map-
ping f : f
x
y;
y
xgN ! f
x
y;
y
x;xyg. Let n￿ be the lowest integer exceeding
#N
2 .
Picking any ￿ 2 fn￿;:::;ng, we de￿ne a ￿￿majority rule as a social choice
rule f￿ : f
x
y;
y
xgN ! f
x
y;
y
x;xyg where for any p = (p1;:::;p#N) 2 f
x
y;
y
xg we
have f￿(p) =
x
y () #fi 2 N : pi =
x
yg ￿ ￿ and f￿(p) =
y
x () #fi 2
N : pi =
y
xg ￿ ￿.6 Theorem 3.2 of Asan and Sanver (2006) character-
izes the set of Pareto optimal, anonymous, neutral and Maskin monotonic
aggregation rules in terms of ￿￿majority rules. In that abstract setting,
Pareto optimality, anonymity and neutrality respectively coincide with our
non-imposedness, anonymity and impartiality. On the other hand Maskin
monotonicity is stronger than our monotonicity. So by Theorem 2.4, we can
deduce that the class of ￿￿majority rules is a subset of the class of sub-
jective (!; 1
2)￿majority rules with ! being 1
2￿anonymous. In other words,
every aggregation rule that gives every coalition in the society its ￿objective￿
weight (i.e., letting the weight of K 2 2N be
#K
#N) but possibly quali￿es the
required majority can alternatively be expressed by ￿xing majority as usual
(i.e., as any coalition whose cardinality exceeds its complement) but assigning
monotonic and 1
2￿anonymous (subjective) weights to coalitions.
Remark 2.3 As is for Theorem 2.1, Theorems 2.2 and 2.3 can be stated by
simultaneously adding anonymity to the perception function and the corre-
sponding ￿￿anonymity with ￿ = q to the weight distribution.
3 Stereotype Formation Under Imperfect Ob-
servation
3.1 Axioms Revisited
Throughout the section, we ￿x some non-empty set V ( N of visible group
members and consider the perception function  V : TV ! f1;0;￿1g. The ex-
istence of invisible group members entails a revision of the non-imposedness
axiom. For, an observer who fails to observe some members of the group
may be cautious to bring a global perception of the group, even when the
prevailing trait pro￿le is unanimous: Suppose a small group of Martians who
5where
x
y is interpreted as x being preferred to y and
y
x is interpreted as y being
preferred to x. So individual preferences do not admit indi⁄erence between x and y.
6Thus f￿(p) = xy () #fi 2 N : pi =
x
yg < ￿ and #fi 2 N : pi =
y
xg < ￿.
10are all aggressive attack the World. A human who knows the existence of
other unobserved Martians may be prudent in qualifying Martians as aggres-
sive, hence refusing to bring a global judgement about them under the hope
that the unobservable crowd of Martians are peaceful. Thus, under imperfect
observation, we propose the following version of the non-imposedness axiom:
Non-Imposedness: A perception function  V : TV ! f1;0;￿1g is
non-imposed i⁄  V(1;1;:::;1) 2 f0;1g and  V(￿1;￿1;:::;￿1) 2 f￿1;0g.
Remark that the imperfect information version of non-imposedness is
neither weaker nor stronger than its perfect information version. For, it is
weakened by allowing the refusal of judgements but strenghtened by being
imposed over the pro￿les where unanimity is reached among the members
of V . Monotonicity, impartiality, positive prejudice and negative prejudice
exhibit a strenghtening of the similar spirit, as we now impose them when
the related changes in the trait pro￿les occur in the visible part of the group.
Monotonicity: A perception function  V : TV ! f1;0;￿1g is monotonic
i⁄  V(t) ￿  V(t0) 8 t;t0 2 TV with ti ￿ t0
i 8i 2 V .
Impartiality: A perception function  V : TV ! f1;0;￿1g satis￿es
impartiality i⁄  V(t0) = ￿ V(t) 8t;t0 2 TV such that t0
i = ￿ti 8i 2 V .
Positive Prejudice: We say that a perception function  V : TV !
f1;0;￿1g admits positive prejudice i⁄
(i) 9 t 2 TV such that  V (t) = 1 and  V (￿t) 2 f0;1g
and
(ii)  V (t) 2 f￿1;0g =)  V (￿t) = 1 8 t 2 TV.
Negative Prejudice: We say that a perception function  V : TV !
f1;0;￿1g admits negative prejudice i⁄
(i) 9 t 2 TV such that  V (t) = ￿1 and  V (￿t) 2 f￿1;0g
and
(ii)  V (t) = f0;1g =)  V (￿t) = ￿1 8 t 2 TV
To characterize perception under imperfect observation, we use the con-
junction of non-imposedness and monotonicity with one of impartiality, pos-
itive prejudice and negative prejudice. The following proposition establishes
the logical relationship between these axioms7:
Proposition 3.1 (i) Monotonicity and impartiality imply non-imposedness.
(ii)Monotonicity and impartiality are logically independent.
(iii)Non-imposedness, monotonicity and positive prejudice are logically
independent.
(iv)Non-imposedness, monotonicity and negative prejudice are logically
independent.
7As is in the perfect observation case (see Footnote 2), impartiality, positive prejudice
and negative prejudice are pairwise logically incompatible.
11Proof. Proof of (i): Let  V : TV ! f￿1;0;1g satisfy impartiality and fail
non-imposedness. We have  V (1;1;:::1) = ￿1 or  V (￿1;￿1;:::;￿1) = 1 by
the failure of non-imposedness which, by impartiality, implies  V (1;1;:::1) =
￿1 and  V (￿1;￿1;:::;￿1) = 1, contradicting monotonicity.
Proof of (ii): De￿ne  V : TV ! f￿1;0;1g as  V (1;1;:::;1) = ￿1,
 V (￿1;￿1;:::;￿1) = 1 and  V (t) = 0 8t 2 TV with ti = 1, tj = ￿1 for
some i;j 2 V . Check that  V is impartial but not monotonic. Now let
 V (t) = 1 8t 2 TV and check that  V is monotonic but not impartial.
Proof of (iii): To see that non-imposedness and monotonicity do not im-
ply positive prejudice, let  V (1;1;:::;1) = 1 and  V (t) = ￿1 for any t 2 TV
with ti 2 f￿1;0g for some i 2 V . To see that non-imposedness and pos-
itive prejudice do not imply monotonicity, let #V = 3 and let  V (t) = 1
if #fi 2 V : ti = 1g 2 f1;3g;  V (t) = ￿1 if #fi 2 V : ti = 1g = 2 and
 V (￿1;￿1;￿1) = 0. To see that monotonicity and positive prejudice do not
imply non-imposedness let  V (t) = 1 8t 2 TV.
Proof of (iv): To see that non-imposedness and monotonicity do not im-
ply negative prejudice, let  V (￿1;￿1;:::;￿1) = ￿1 and  V (t) = 1 for any
t 2 TV with ti 2 f0;1g for some i 2 V . To see that non-imposedness and neg-
ative prejudice do not imply monotonicty let #V = 3 and let  V (t) = ￿1 if
#fi 2 V : ti = 1g 2 f0;2g;  V (1;1;1) = 0 and  V (t) = 1 if #fi 2 V : ti = 1g =
1. To see that monotonicity and negative prejudice do not imply non-imposedness
let  V (t) = ￿1 8t 2 TV.
3.2 Subjective Majority Rules Revisited
A (subjective) weight distribution as an ordered pair ￿ = (!;p) where ! :
2V ! [0;1] is a mapping satisfying
(i) !(K) + !(V nK) = 1 for all K 2 2V
(ii) !(V ) = 1
(iii) !(K) ￿ !(L) for all K;L 2 2V with K ￿ L
and p 2 [0;1] re￿ ects the weight of V in N.8
Given a weight distribution ￿ = (!;p) and any q 2 (0;1), a subjective
(￿;q)￿majority rule is a perception function  
￿;q
V : TV ! f1;0;￿1g de￿ned
for each t 2 TV as follows:
 
￿;q
V (t) =
8
<
:
1 if p:!(fi 2 V : ti = 1g) > q
￿1 if p:!(fi 2 V : ti = ￿1g) > 1 ￿ q
0 otherwise
9
=
;
8Remark that under perfect observation, we used ! to express the weight distribution
within N but now it expresses the (monotonic) weight distribution within V coupled with
the parameter p which re￿ ects the weight of V in N. Of course when p = 1, V can be
conceived as the whole society, bringing us back to the case of perfect observation.
12So the observer looks at V with some subjective opinion about how rep-
resentative its subgroups are. Moreover, he has a subjective opinion about
the representativenes of V within the whole society. If, according to these
subjective opinions, the weight of those who possess the trait exceeds q, then
the observer concludes that the group globally possesses that trait. Similarly,
if the (subjective) weight of those who do not possess the trait exceeds 1￿q,
then the observer concludes that the group globally does not possess that
trait.9 If neither of these two cases holds then no conclusion is derived.
Theorem 3.1 A perception function  V : TV ! f1;0;￿1g satis￿es monotonic-
ity and impartiality i⁄  V is a subjective (￿; 1
2)￿majority rule for some sub-
jective weight distribution ￿ = (!;p).
Proof. We leave the ￿if￿part to the reader. To see the ￿only if￿part, take
any  V : TV ! f￿1;0;1g that satis￿es monotonicity and impartiality. Let
W  = fK 2 2V :  V (t) = 1 for t 2 TV with ti = 1 8i 2 K and ti = ￿1
8i 2 V nKg and L  = fK 2 2V :  V (t) = ￿1 for t 2 TV with ti = 1
8i 2 K and ti = ￿1 8i 2 V nKg. We set O  = 2Vn(W  [L ). Note that the
perception function  V de￿ned as  V(t) = 0 at each t 2 TV is monotonic and
impartial. So W  and L  can both be empty. However, by the impartiality
of  V, we have W  = ; () L  = ;. In fact, W  = ; () L  = ; ()
 V(t) = 0 8t 2 TV. First consider the case where W  = ; and L  = ;. So
 V(t) = 0 8t 2 TV. Take any subjective weight distribution ￿ = (!;p) with
p 2 [0; 1
2). It is straightforward to check that the subjective (￿; 1
2)￿majority
rule coincides with  V. Now consider the case where neither W  nor L  is
empty. Thus, V 2 W  and ; 2 L . Consider the function ! : 2V ! [0;1]
where ! (K) = 1 8K 2 W , ! (K) = 0 8K 2 L  and ! (K) = 1
2 8K 2 O .
The impartiality of  V ensures K 2 W  () V nK 2 L  8K 2 2V and thus
K 2 O  () V nK 2 O  8K 2 2V. Hence ! (K) + ! (V nK) = 1 8K 2 2V
while ! (V ) = 1. Moreover, the monotonicity of  V implies !(K) ￿ !(L)
for all K;L 2 2V with K ￿ L. Thus, any p 2 [0;1] induces a subjective
weight distribution (!;p). Pick p = 1 and let ￿ = (!;1). We claim that the
subjective (￿; 1
2)￿majority rule  
￿; 1
2
V : TV ! f￿1;0;1g coincides with  V. To
see this, take any t 2 TV. If  V (t) = 1, then K = fi 2 V : ti = 1g 2 W 
and ! (K) = 1, implying p:! (K) = 1 > 1
2, which establishes  
￿; 1
2
V (t) = 1.
If  V (t) = ￿1, then K = fi 2 V : ti = 1g 2 L  and ! (K) = 0, hence
! (V nK) = 1, implying p:! (V nK) = 1 > 1
2, which establishes  
￿; 1
2
V (t) =
￿1. If  V (t) = 0, then K = fi 2 V : ti = 1g 2 O  and ! (K) = 1
2, hence
9Remark that p:!(fi 2 V : ti = ￿1g) > 1 ￿ q and p:!(fi 2 V : ti = 1g) < q are
equivalent requirements if and only if p = 1. See Footnote 3.
13! (V nK) = 1
2. Thus neither p:! (K) > 1
2, nor p:! (V nK) > 1
2 holds, which
establishes  
￿; 1
2
V (t) = 0.
Theorem 3.2 Given any V ( N, a perception function  V : TV ! f1;0;￿1g
satis￿es non-imposedness, monotonicity and positive prejudice i⁄  V is a
subjective (￿;q)￿majority rule with q 2 (0; 1
2) while ￿ = (!;p) is a weight
distribution such that p > maxf2q;1 ￿ qg and ! (K) 2 [
q
p;
1￿q
p ] for some
K 2 2V.10
Proof. To see the ￿if￿part, let  V be a subjective (￿;q)￿majority rule as in
the statement of the theorem. It is straightforward to check  
￿;q
V satis￿es non-
imposedness and monotonicity. To show that  
￿;q
V satis￿es positive prejudice,
take some K 2 2V with ! (K) 2 (
q
p;
1￿q
p ]. So  
￿;q
V (t) = 1 for t 2 TV with
ti = 1 8i 2 K and ti = ￿1 8i 2 V nK. Moreover, as p:! (K) ￿ 1 ￿ q, we
have  
￿;q
V (￿t) 2 f0;1g. Now take any t 2 TV with  
￿;q
V (t) 2 f￿1;0g and
let K = fi 2 V : ti = 1g. If  
￿;q
V (t) = ￿1 then p:! (V nK) > 1 ￿ q > q,
implying  V (￿t) = 1. If  
￿;q
V (t) = 0 then p:! (K) ￿ q. As p > 2q, we have
! (K) < 1
2, thus ! (V nK) > 1
2 and p:! (V nK) > 2q, implying  V (￿t) = 1
which shows that  
￿;q
V satis￿es positive prejudice. To see the ￿only if￿part,
take any  V : TV ! f1;0;￿1g that satis￿es non-imposedness, monotonicity
and positive prejudice. We de￿ne W , O  and L  as in Theorem 3.1. Note
that V 2 W . Moreover, while one of O  and L  may be empty, O  [ L 
is non-empty. Now pick some q 2 (0; 1
2) and consider the function ! : 2V !
[0;1] de￿ned for each K 2 2V as ! (K) = ! (V nK) = 1
2 when K, V nK 2
W ; ! (K) = 0 and ! (V nK) = 1 when K 2 L  and V nK 2 W ; ! (K) = q
and ! (V nK) = 1 ￿ q when K 2 O  and V nK 2 W . Note that positive
prejudice ensures K 2 L  [ O  =) V nK 2 W  for each K 2 2V. Thus
!(K)+!(V nK) = 1 8K 2 2V with !(V ) = 1, while the monotonicity of  V
implies !(K) ￿ !(L) for all K;L 2 2V with K ￿ L. Thus, any p 2 [0;1]
induces a subjective weight distribution (!;p). Take any p 2 [0;1] with p >
maxf2q; 1￿qg. We will show that ! (K) 2 [
q
p;
1￿q
p ] for some K 2 2V. Recall
that O [L  is non-empty. First let O  be non-empty and take some S 2 O .
So V nS 2 O  and by construction of ! we have ! (V nS) = 1 ￿ q, thus
! (V nS) ￿
1￿q
p . Moreover, 1 ￿ q > q and p > 2q, thus ! (V nS) = 1 ￿ q >
q
p,
establishing ! (V nS) 2 (
q
p;
1￿q
p ]. By de￿nition of O , we have p:! (S) ￿ q,
thus ! (S) ￿
q
p < 1
2 implying ! (V nS) ￿ 1 ￿
q
p > 1
2 >
q
p. Again by de￿nition
of O , we have p:! (V nS) ￿ 1 ￿ q. Thus ! (V nS) 2 (
q
p;
1￿q
p ]. Now let O 
be empty. By positive prejudice, 9K 2 W  such that V nK 2 W . Thus
10Note that p > maxf2q;1 ￿ qg ensures
q
p,
1￿q
p 2 (0;1). Moreover, q 2 (0; 1
2) ensures
q
p <
1￿q
p .
14!(K) = 1
2 2 [
q
p;
1￿q
p ], by the choice of p. Writing ￿ = (!;p), we complete the
proof by showing that the (￿;q)￿majority rule  
￿;q
V coincides with  V. To
see this, take any t 2 TV. If  (t) = 1, then K = fi 2 N : ti = 1g 2 W  and
! (K) 2 f1
2;1 ￿ q;1g. Moreover, p > 2q. Thus, p:! (K) > q, establishing
 
￿;q
V (t) = 1. If  (t) = 0, then K = fi 2 N : ti = 1g 2 O  and ! (K) = q,
hence ! (V nK) = 1 ￿ q. Thus, neither p:! (K) > q, nor p:! (V nK) > 1 ￿ q
holds, which establishes  
￿;q
V (t) = 0. If  (t) = ￿1, then K = fi 2 N : ti =
1g 2 L  and ! (K) = 0, hence ! (V nK) = 1 implying p:! (V nK) = p > 1￿q,
which establishes  
￿;q
V (t) = ￿1.
Theorem 3.3 Given any V ( N, a perception function  V : TV ! f1;0;￿1g
satis￿es non-imposedness, monotonicity and negative prejudice i⁄  V is a
subjective (￿;q)￿majority rule with q 2 (1
2;1) while ￿ = (!;p) is a weight
distribution such that p > maxf2q;1 ￿ qg and ! (K) 2 [
1￿q
p ;
q
p] for some
K 2 2V.11
Proof. To see the ￿if￿part, let  V be a subjective (￿;q)￿majority rule as in
the statement of the theorem. It is straightforward to check  
￿;q
V satis￿es non-
imposedness and monotonicity. To show that  
￿;q
V satis￿es negative prejudice,
take some K 2 2V with ! (K) 2 (
1￿q
p ;
q
p]. So  
￿;q
V (t) = ￿1 for t 2 TV with
ti = ￿1 8i 2 K and ti = 1 8i 2 V nK. Moreover, as p:! (K) ￿ q, we have
 
￿;q
V (￿t) 2 f￿1;0g. Now take any t 2 TV with  
￿;q
V (t) 2 f0;1g and let K =
fi 2 V : ti = 1g. If  
￿;q
V (t) = 1 then p:! (K) > q > 1￿q, implying  V (￿t) =
￿1. If  
￿;q
V (t) = 0 then p:! (V nK) ￿ 1 ￿ q. As p > 2q and q > 1 ￿ q, we
have p > 2(1 ￿ q). So ! (V nK) < 1
2, thus ! (K) > 1
2 and p:! (K) > 1 ￿ q,
implying  V (￿t) = ￿1 which shows that  
￿;q
V satis￿es negative prejudice.
To see the ￿only if￿part, take any  V : TV ! f1;0;￿1g that satis￿es non-
imposedness, monotonicity and negative prejudice. We de￿ne W , O  and
L  as in Theorem 3.1. Note that ; 2 L . Moreover, while one of W  and O 
may be empty, W [O  is non-empty. Now pick some q 2 (1
2;1) and consider
the function ! : 2V ! [0;1] de￿ned for each K 2 2V as ! (K) = ! (V nK) = 1
2
when K, V nK 2 L ; ! (K) = 0 and ! (V nK) = 1 when K 2 L  and V nK 2
W ; ! (K) = q and ! (V nK) = 1￿q when K 2 O  and V nK 2 L . Note that
negative prejudice ensures K 2 W  [ O  =) V nK 2 L  for each K 2 2V.
Thus !(K) + !(V nK) = 1 8K 2 2V with !(V ) = 1, while the monotonicity
of  V implies !(K) ￿ !(L) for all K;L 2 2V with K ￿ L. Thus, any
p 2 [0;1] induces a subjective weight distribution (!;p). Take any p 2 [0;1]
with p > maxf2q; 1 ￿ qg. We will show that ! (K) 2 [
1￿q
p ;
q
p] for some
K 2 2V. Recall that W  [ O  is non-empty. First let O  be non-empty and
11Note that p > maxf2q;1 ￿ qg ensures
q
p,
1￿q
p 2 (0;1). Moreover, q 2 (1
2;1) ensures
1￿q
p <
q
p.
15take some S 2 O . By construction of ! we have ! (S) = q, thus ! (S) ￿
q
p.
Moreover, q > 1 ￿ q and p > 2(1 ￿ q), thus ! (S) = q >
1￿q
p , establishing
! (S) 2 (
1￿q
p ;
q
p]. Now let O  be empty. By negative prejudice, 9K 2 L  such
that V nK 2 L . Thus !(K) = 1
2 2 [
1￿q
p ;
q
p], by the construction of ! and the
choice of p. Writing ￿ = (!;p), we complete the proof by showing that the
(￿;q)￿majority rule  
￿;q
V coincides with  V. To see this, take any t 2 TV.
If  (t) = 1, then K = fi 2 N : ti = 1g 2 W  and ! (K) = 1, implying
p:! (K) = p > q, which establishes  
￿;q
V (t) = 1. If  (t) = 0, then K = fi 2
N : ti = 1g 2 O  and ! (K) = q, hence ! (V nK) = 1 ￿ q. Thus, neither
p:! (K) > q, nor p:! (V nK) > 1 ￿ q holds, which establishes  
￿;q
V (t) = 0.
If  (t) = ￿1, then K = fi 2 N : ti = 1g 2 L  and ! (K) 2 f0;1 ￿ q; 1
2g,
hence ! (V nK) 2 f1
2;q;1g. As p > 2q, p:! (V nK) > q > 1 ￿ q, establishing
 
￿;q
V (t) = ￿1.
4 Concluding Remarks
We propose a formalization of the attribution hypothesis by modeling the for-
mation of stereotypes as an aggregation of prevailing individual traits.12 We
show, under very mild axioms, that an observer can be thought of perceiving
a group in terms of three parameters:
￿ In case the group is not perfectly visible, the subjective weight p 2 [0;1]
of the visible members within the whole group.
￿ A weight distribution ! over the visible part of the group (re￿ ecting
the subjective opinion of the observer about the representativeness of
coalitions).
￿ A (dis)quali￿ed majority q 2 (0;1) (which is related to a possible prej-
udice that the observer may have).
The perception - compatible with the claim of Zawadski (1948) quoted in
Section 1- proceeds as follows: An observer of the Turkish society perceives
the group as smoker (resp., non-smoker) if and only if a ￿majority￿of Turks
12Nevertheless, the tools we propose can be used to model the categorization hypothesis
over which an alternative strand of the social psychology literature rises. The catego-
rization hypothesis postulates a comparative reasoning in the formation of stereotypes:
Whether a group is judged to possess a trait depends on the prevalance of that trait
relative to some other comparison group. For gender stereotypes, Krueger et al. (2003)
present empirical evidence in favor of the attribution hypothesis. For a more general and
axiomatic analysis of categorization, see Azrieli and Lehrer (2007).
16are smokers (resp. non-smokers). This approach di⁄ers from usual majoritar-
ianism. For, whether the (non)-smoker Turks form a majority in the Turkish
society depends on p and !, which expresses the observer￿ s subjective percep-
tion of how representative the observed (non)-smoker Turks are. Moreover,
the observer may have a prejudice about the Turkish society being smoker or
not, which is incorporated into the aggregation function through the choice
of q.13
Our ￿ndings allow to keep track of three di⁄erent possible generalizations
(expressed through p, !, q) underlying the formation of stereotypes. As
a consequence, we are able to present a conceptual distinction between a
stereotype and a prejudice. In fact, the existence of a stereotype does not
necessarily imply the existence of a prejudice. As our theorems make it clear,
a stereotype can be the outcome of an impartial aggregation of individual
traits. In fact, the existence of a prejudice depends on one parameter (namely
q) of the aggregation function and not on the outcome itself.
To be sure, our axiomatic characterizations do not allow to di⁄erenti-
ate whether people form stereotypes by using subjective majority rules or
as if they are using subjective majority rules.14 However, the truth of the
former raises interesting institutional design questions about a⁄ecting stereo-
type formation so as to ameliorate social outcomes. After all, the existence
of stereotypes seems to be inevitable15 and their desirability depends on the
social outcomes they induce. For example, we may wish to overthrow stereo-
types which foster racism but endorse those, such as the image of a brave
￿reman, which support the supply of public goods. Hence, establishing the
relationship between existing or possible institutions and the parameters p,
!, q that individuals possess is certainly a matter of interest. So the simple
but conceptually rich exercise we present, points to new possibilities in ex-
ploring questions of social psychology through the concepts of social choice
theory - hence bringing a theoretical look at this area where an empirical
literature abounds.16
13A dominant approach in social choice theory takes preferences as given and rules out
qualifying social outcomes as ￿correct￿or ￿wrong￿ . This is re￿ ected to our analysis and
leaves no room to illusory correlation in stereotype formation (see Hamilton and Gi⁄ord
(1976)).
14Olson and Fazio (2001) discuss the possibility of stereotype formation without aware-
ness. This is reminiscent to our inability to discriminate, under the weak axiom of revealed
preference, whether decision makers maximize a rational preference or act as if they are
maximizing a rational preference.
15Lee et al. (1995) conceive stereotypes as tools used by the mind to navigate its complex
environment.
16A ￿nal few words, just for a cheerful closing: This last section of the paper has been
completed while Remzi Sanver was the guest of Ecole Polytechnique, Paris. As a result,
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most of the work has been done in Parisian cafØs. Interestingly, while thinking on how to
conclude the paper, a waiter of les Deux Magots made the following remark: ￿You look
much more intellectual than I thought Turks were.￿
18